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Abstract: In the recent debate about the semantics of perspectival expressions (predicates of taste, aesthetic adjectives, 
moral terms, epistemic modals, epistemic terms etc.), disagreement has played a crucial role. In a nutshell, what I call 
“the challenge from disagreement” is the objection that certain views on the market (i.e., contextualism) cannot account 
for the intuition of disagreement present in ordinary exchanges involving perspectival expressions like “Licorice is 
tasty./No, it's not.” Various contextualist answers to this challenge have been proposed, and this has led to a 
proliferation of notions of disagreement. It is now accepted in the debate that there are many notions of disagreement 
and that the search for a common, basic notion is misguided. In this paper I attempt to find such a basic notion 
underneath this diversity. The main aim of the paper is to motivate, forge and defend a notion of “minimal 
disagreement” that has beneficial effects for the debate over the semantics of perspectival expressions. 
 
1 Background 
Disagreement has played an important role in contemporary semantics, especially in connection 
with “perspectival expressions” – predicates of taste like ‘tasty’, ‘fun’, ‘disgusting’, aesthetic 
adjectives like ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘balanced’, moral terms like ‘good’, ‘bad’, (moral) ‘ought’, 
epistemic modals like ‘might’ and ‘must’, epistemic terms like ‘know’, ‘justified’ etc. The main 
characteristic of such expressions is that a perspective needs to be provided for their semantic 
interpretation. The sense of “perspective” relevant in each case is, of course, different (amounting to 
a standard of taste in the case of predicates of taste, to an aesthetic standard in the case of aesthetic 
adjectives etc.), but here I will use it as a umbrella term covering all those more specific senses. 
 In the current literature, three main views are in dispute over the semantics of perspectival 
expressions. The first is contextualism, according to which utterances of sentences containing the 
expressions in question have propositional perspective-specific semantic contents. A propositional 
perspective-specific content is one that has a perspective as its part. For example, under a certain 
version of contextualism that takes the speaker’s perspective to be relevant, the proposition 
expressed by Lisa’s utterance of 
 




is that licorice is tasty for Lisa/from Lisa’s perspective.1 The second view is relativism, according to 
which utterances of sentences containing the expressions in question have propositional 
perspective-neutral semantic contents. A propositional perspective-neutral content is one from 
which a perspective is lacking; instead, perspectives are contributed to the semantic machinery as 
part of the “circumstances of evaluation” (Kaplan 1989)). For example, under a certain version of 
relativism that takes the speaker’s perspective to be relevant, the proposition expressed by Lisa’s 
utterance of (1) is simply that licorice is tasty; the perspective is contributed by the circumstance 
against which such an utterance is to be evaluated. Finally, the third main view in the debate is 
expressivism, according to which utterances of sentences containing the expressions in question 
express the states of mind or the attitudes of the speaker. Pure versions of expressivism differ from 
hybrid versions in that according to the former, the only role of utterances of sentences like (1) is 
that of expressing the speaker’s states of mind/attitudes, whereas according to the latter, utterances 
of sentences like (1) also have propositional semantic contents, besides expressing the states of 
mind/attitudes of speakers.2 
One of the most discussed objections in the current debate between the three views involves 
disagreement. More precisely, the objection is that some of the views in the debate cannot account 
for the intuition of faultless disagreement in ordinary exchanges involving perspectival expressions 
such as 
 
Lisa: Licorice is tasty. 
Bart: No, licorice is not tasty. (…)3, 
 
which are claimed to elicit both the intuition that Lisa and Bart disagree and the intuition that they 
are not at fault (in the relevant sense). This is a challenge that mostly relativists (Kölbel (2004b); 
Lasersohn (2005, 2016); MacFarlane (2014) etc.) have leveled against contextualist views. 
                                                             
1 There are other versions of contextualism as well. For example, one can take the perspective to be that of the group 
Lisa belongs to, or a generic perspective etc. This variation will not affect the main points of the paper. The same 
applies to relativism as well. 
2 Absolutist, or invariantist, views about perspectival expressions are also present in the literature. They are, however, a 
minority. In addition, the focus in this paper is on accounting for disagreement, and absolutist views are not problematic 
in this respect – although there is some variety in the way disagreement is construed within the absolutist camp. See 
Wyatt (2018) for a recent non-orthodox absolutist approach to disagreement involving predicates of taste. 
3 The parentheses are meant to signify that the data need not be as simple as the exchange between Bart and Lisa above. 
Disagreement, faultless or not, can appear as part of longer exchanges, or can stretch over longer periods of time etc. 
However, I take it to be quite intuitive that the part of an exchange that prompts the intuition of disagreement is 
something similar to the simple exchange (the word “No” being usually a reliable indication of disagreement). See 
Kinzel & Kusch (2018) for a recent view on the methodological effect of focusing on simple exchanges like the one 
above. It is also customary to distinguish between disagreement in state and disagreement in act (Cappelen & 
Hawthorne (2009)): the latter requires some interaction between the disagreeing parties, while the former doesn’t. 
Disagreement in state is taken to be the more fundamental notion (see, among others, MacFarlane (2014)); however, 
since I focus here on exchanges, I will take disagreement in act as the relevant notion – which is, of course, compatible 
with disagreement in state having explanatory priority. 
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One thing worth noting in connection to the contemporary form taken by this objection is 
that the notion of disagreement initially assumed is doxastic disagreement. Take, for example, the 
following definition of “faultless disagreement” proposed by Kölbel in the early stages of the 
debate: 
 
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a thinker B, and a 
proposition (a content of judgment) p such that 
(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p 
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault). (Kölbel 2004a: 53-54) 
 
Clause (b) spells out faultlessness, but clause (a) focuses on disagreement, which is conceived in 
terms of doxastic attitudes (belief, judgment) towards propositions. I will leave faultlessness aside 
in this paper and focus entirely on disagreement. What I call “the challenge from disagreement” is 
the challenge for contextualism (but also for the other views in the debate) to account for the 
intuition of disagreement present in exchanges like the one above, where disagreement is taken to 
be doxastic. 
Various answers to the challenge from disagreement have surfaced in recent literature. The 
many ways in which the challenge has been answered can be grouped in three categories. In the first 
belong responses that downplay the intuition of disagreement in the cases put forward by relativists. 
Thus, several authors have complained that the exchanges usually presented are too skeletal to give 
rise to intuitions of disagreement and that, once the exchanges are properly fleshed out, the 
intuitions of disagreement vanishes (Stojanovic (2007); Glanzberg (2007); Cappelen & Hawthorne 
(2009); Moltmann (2010); Schaffer (2011) etc.). A second type of answer consists in conceiving 
disagreement in exchanges involving perspectival expressions as pragmatic and not semantic. Given 
the multitude of phenomena that can be deemed pragmatic, this answer takes multiple forms. Thus, 
certain authors (e.g., Finlay (2005)) have taken the disagreement to be not at the level of semantic 
content, but at the level of implicatures, on the model of disagreements like ‘A: Todd has four 
kids./B: No, he has five.’, where what is disagreed about is whether Todd has exactly four kids. 
Further, other authors (López de Sa (2007, 2008, 2015); Parsons (2013); Zakkou (2019)) have taken 
disagreement to arise at the level of presuppositions or be made possible by certain presuppositions 
being in place, as in ‘A: John has stopped smoking./B: No, he never smoked.’, where the 
disagreement is about whether John has smoked, not about whether he has stopped smoking. Other 
contextualists (Sundell (2011); Plunkett & Sundell (2013); Ludlow (2014); Plunkett (2015)) have 
taken disagreement in exchanges like the above to be metalinguistic, on the model of exchanges like 
‘A: Feynman is tall./B: No, he’s not tall.’, where Feynman’s height is not the issue, but rather what 
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counts (or what should count) as tall in the context. Finally, disagreement has been cashed out in 
discursive terms: in the example ‘A: Everyone can vote./B: No, women still cannot vote.’ (Silk 
(2016)), A and B disagree by proposing different conversational moves (A to take the range of the 
quantifier to consist only of men, B to take it to consist of all human beings of the right age and 
nationality etc.). The third and last type of answer to the challenge was to take disagreement to be 
conative rather than cognitive/doxastic (Huvenes (2012, 2014); Stojanovic (2012); Marques & 
García-Carpintero (2014); Marques (2015, 2016)). Here the model followed are expressivist 
theories of, e.g., moral terms: as many early expressivist have contended, in an exchange like ‘A: 
Stealing is wrong./B: No, stealing is not wrong.’, the moral term ‘wrong’ is meant to express the 
speakers’ attitudes towards stealing – thus, a “disagreement in attitude” rather than in belief 
(Stevenson (1963)).4 
This plethora of answers has led to a proliferation of notions of disagreement. That there is 
more than one notion of disagreement seems to be accepted by all parties to the debate. MacFarlane 
(2014, chapter 6), for example, goes as far as claiming that the question of what real disagreement 
is might not be the right one to ask; rather, we should ask what type of disagreement is suitable for a 
given area of discourse.5 Given the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon, diversity in this respect 
might be a good idea. However, my aim in this paper is to see if there is a basic notion of 
disagreement to be found underneath this diversity that can play a useful role in the debate.6 I will 
show that such a notion does indeed exist, that it can play several important roles, that it can be 
easily forged and that it can be defended from objections. I call such a notion “minimal 
disagreement”. Thus, in what follows I will motivate the need to propose such a notion (section 2), 
then proceed to forge it (section 3) and finally defend it from several natural, but ultimately 
unconvincing, objections (section 4). 
 
2 Motivating minimal disagreement 
Before putting forward the notion of minimal disagreement that I think can play an important role in 
the debate over the semantic treatment of perspectival expressions, let me present several 
motivations for having such a notion in the first place. I take each of the following to constitute a 
good motivation in itself, but as strength is in numbers, a battery of motivations makes for a more 
solid case for putting it forward. 
                                                             
4 See Zeman (2017) for more details on the various recent contextualist strategies. 
5 Whether this way of framing pluralism about disagreement is ultimately successful is not clear. See Zeman (2020) for 
some doubts about MacFarlane’s pluralist approach. This issue, however, is not my present concern. 
6 Among previous attempts at putting forward or discussions of such a notion the following works can be counted: 
Belleri & Palmira (2013), Baker (2014), Belleri (2014), Coliva & Moruzzi (2014) and, more recently, Worsnip (2019). 
It will become clear in due course how the notion I propose differs from theirs. 
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First, I think a notion of minimal disagreement can capture the “folk notion” of 
disagreement that people employ. Whether there is such a folk notion, or one that is consistent, is 
obviously a contentious issue. However, I think that the following question can nevertheless be 
asked: what do all exchanges intuitively judged as disagreement have in common? One way to 
answer this question is to point towards a notion that is minimal in the sense of underscoring 
peoples’ judgments about whether a certain exchange is a disagreement or not. Such a take on the 
“folk notion” of disagreement seems to me quite reasonable and with good chances to lead to a 
philosophically interesting notion of disagreement. (Exactly how interesting and what its precise 
role is remains to be seen below.) 
A natural question that arises at this juncture is: what are the types of exchanges that people 
judge to be disagreement – or, as I will call it, the “intuitive base” of the phenomenon? The status of 
intuitions in philosophy is highly debated, and it’s not my intention to enter the debate over it here. 
However, I’ll take it to be unobjectionable that exchanges like (1) elicit an intuition of disagreement 
– regardless of how this disagreement is going to be spelled out. I take it to be equally 
unobjectionable that similar exchanges involving other perspectival expressions – aesthetic 
adjectives, moral terms, epistemic modals, ‘know’ and its ilk – elicit that intuition as well. In fact, 
I’m happy to accept most (or even all) exchanges that have been proposed in the literature as 
eliciting an intuition of disagreement, including potentially objectionable ones like 
 
Lisa: I like licorice. 
Bart: Well, I don’t. 
 
(uttered perhaps with stress on the second ‘I’), or 
 
Lisa: I like this chili. 
Bart: I disagree, it’s too hot for me. (Adapted from Huvenes, 2011: 1) 
 
My attitude here is to be as lax as possible with respect to what constitutes the intuitive base of the 
phenomenon. Of course, here one should eventually defer to the findings of empirical studies. But 
since so far such (conclusive) studies are missing, intuition is all we have to rely on – perhaps 
counterbalanced by theoretical considerations, in a reflective equilibrium (as Worsnip (2019), for 
example, suggests). Following this method, it might turn out that certain exchanges, like the ones 
above, will be ruled out as disagreements according to the theory, even if (presumably) there is an 
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intuition of disagreement. The important part is that the theory captures core cases of disagreement, 
like our initial exchange between Lisa and Bart.7 
A second, related motivation is linguistic: words like ‘disagree’ and ‘disagreement’, as 
ordinarily used by most of us, don’t seem to be ambiguous – at least not according to the standard 
tests for ambiguity.8 Thus, according to the conjunction reduction test, someone can felicitously 
report two disagreements, even perceived as being over different issues and possibly of different 
kinds, with a sentence like ‘Lisa and Bart as well as Marge and Homer disagree/are in 
disagreement’. Ellipsis is felicitous too: ‘I saw Lisa and Bart disagree/in disagreement and Marge 
and Homer, too.’ Further, according to the contradiction test, one cannot felicitously utter a 
sentence like ‘Lisa and Bart disagree but they don’t disagree’ or ‘Lisa and Bart are in disagreement 
but they are not in disagreement’ (at least not without some strong emphasis on the last word of 
each sentence). While none of these tests are bullet proof (see Sennet (2016) for a comprehensive 
study), prima facie ‘disagree’ and ‘disagreement’ don’t seem to be ambiguous. A unique (and, 
given the multiplicity of the data, minimal) notion of disagreement is in line with this result.  
A third motivation for putting forward a notion of minimal disagreement is that it helps 
avoid the threat to those involved in the semantic debate focused on here to talk past each other. 
Given the large number of notions of disagreement proposed in the debate (some of them illustrated 
in section 1) and the equally large number of types of exchanges that intuitively count as 
disagreement (some of them illustrated above), there is a significant risk that semanticists will end 
up talking about different phenomena. Having a single notion of disagreement that underscores all 
the exchanges that form the intuitive base of the phenomenon of disagreement would make this 
possibility less likely. In all likelihood, such a notion would be minimal, rather than substantial.  
A fourth motivation for a notion of minimal disagreement is economy: having one basic 
notion to rely on when arguing about semantic matters instead of several (a list of which has been 
given in section 1) simply makes for a more parsimonious account. Again, given the complexity of 
the debate illustrated at the end of section 1, that unique notion has good chances to be minimal.   
Last but not least, there is a very good motivation that is strictly internal to the debate over 
the role of disagreement in the semantics of perspectival expressions – namely, that the way in 
which disagreement is conceived by the parties to the debate has important methodological 
                                                             
7 Having said that, I take the indeterminacy of the disagreement data to stem from our current limitation of gathering or 
interpreting it, and I’m moderately optimistic about the possibility of ultimately coming up, by empirical means, with a 
definite set of exchanges that should be counted as disagreement. Thus, I take the indeterminacy of the data to be rather 
temporary. This contrasts with the indeterminacy of the notion of minimal disagreement, which comes, so to speak, by 
design. See the discussion in section 4.3. 
8 As I mentioned, in the literature there is a commonly accepted distinction between disagreement in act and 
disagreement in state (Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009)). Assuming that this distinction is accepted by the folk, the claim 
here is that there is no ambiguity left once we fix on one of the two senses. I thank a referee for bringing this motivation 
to my attention. 
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consequences for the semantic treatment of perspectival expressions. As many authors have noted, 
if one builds into the notion of disagreement theory-internal assumptions (e.g., concerning a certain 
type of semantic content), one begs the question against proponents of alternative theories with 
respect to accounting for disagreement. Thus, a notion of minimal disagreement is needed in order 
to keep the debate fair. This idea is neatly expressed by Baker, who says that what we need is “an 
account of the phenomenon which is independent of the assumptions and apparatus of any 
particular semantic theory” (2014: 41), while Palmira puts the point as follows: 
 
To my mind, this neutrality is crucial since, in order for faultless disagreement to be of any 
significance for debates in semantics, the phenomenon must be conceived of as a neutral 
field of battle on which different semantic theories confront each other. It would be 
dialectically ineffective, let alone question-begging, to maintain that faultless disagreement 
is evidence in favour of, say, Relativism rather than Contextualism, if the phenomenon were 
described in a relativist-loaded way in the first place. (2014: 351) 
 
While I take the remarks quoted above to be on the right track, I think that most of the 
authors engaged in the project of finding a minimal (or basic) notion of disagreement (besides the 
two works quoted, see also Belleri & Palmira (2013) and Coliva & Moruzzi (2014)) are not going 
far enough.9 These authors have been concerned with the debate between contextualism and 
relativism about perspectival expressions exclusively. Yet, even a quick look at the current 
literature shows that expressivism, either in itself or as a part of certain contextualist answers, has 
become a viable position in the debate (see, for example, Buekens (2011); Clapp (2014); Gutzmann 
(2016)) and thus cannot be left aside. My aim in proposing the specific notion of minimal 
disagreement that I do is to rectify this mistake by allowing expressivism (in whatever form) to be 
part of the debate over the semantics of perspectival expressions.10  
To conclude this section, I submit that a notion of minimal disagreement can help with most 
of, if not all, the issues mentioned above – which provides a good motivation for its postulation. It 
                                                             
9 Worsnip’s (2019) view is not objectionable on this score, as it is one of his declared aims to include “disagreement in 
attitude” (expressivists’ favorite notion of disagreement) among the types of disagreement that his notion of “wide 
disagreement” is supposed to cover. My aim in this paper and Worsnip’s in the paper referred to are very similar. I will 
briefly engage with his proposal below (section 4.3., footnote 23). 
10 Of course, this assumes that allowing expressivism in the debate is desirable. Doubts about this come from taking 
expressivism to be a theory about mental states, rather than about the semantic content of utterances like (1). Two things 
can be said to quell this worry. First, taking expressivism to be a theory about mental states is compatible with taking it 
to be a theory of semantic contents of utterances, with presumably most of the work to be done being spelling out the 
connection between these two aspects of the theory. Second, the expressivist authors cited do take themselves to engage 
with views about the semantic content of utterances like (1) (i.e., contextualism, relativism etc.), precisely in connection 
to disagreement – which indicates that they take their theory to account for the same phenomenon. 
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is a notion well suited to play an important role (or roles) in the semantic debate about perspectival 
expressions sketched at the outset. 
 
3 Forging minimal disagreement 
It is one thing to have good motivation to postulate a notion of minimal disagreement, but how 
would one go ahead to forge one? I think the notion of disagreement we are after can be easily 
arrived at by abstracting away from all the notions found in the literature and postulate their 
“neutral” counterpart (i.e., a schema).11 
If we look at the various notions of disagreement proposed, their fundamental differences 
consist in the types of attitudes postulated, the types of content postulated and the level at which 
disagreement is said to arise. Consequently, we can abstract away from i) the type of content 
postulated; ii) the type of conflicting attitudes postulated; iii) the “level of discourse” (semantic, 
pragmatic, discursive moves, implications etc.) at which the conflict arises. Abstracting away from 
all these elements gives us the following definition of minimal disagreement: 
 
(MD) Two people minimally disagree iff there is an A, a B and a C such that 
a) they have conflicting attitudes of type A towards  
b) the same content of type B, at  
c) level of discourse C.12, 13 
 
Before moving on to defending the notion proposed, let me illustrate in detail how various 
proposals in the literature conform to the (MD) schema. That they do so is not surprising, given that 
we abstracted away from them to arrive at the minimal notion, but it is nevertheless instructive to 
show how easy the transition from the minimal notion to the more substantive notions can be made. 
This shows how the notion put forward can be used to systematize the various notions in the debate. 
                                                             
11 The aim of providing a schema or template for disagreement is also that of Belleri & Palmira (2013), whose lead I 
follow. 
12 This comes close to Plunkett & Sundell’s (2013) definition “Disagreement Requires Conflict in Content (DRCC): If 
two subjects A and B disagree with each other, then there are some objects p and q (propositions, plans, etc.) such that 
A accepts p and B accepts q, and p is such that the demands placed on a subject in virtue of accepting it are rationally 
incompatible with the demands placed on a subject in virtue of accepting q.” (11). (MD) differs from their definition in 
that demands placed on subjects are missing, and is thus a more minimal definition.  
13 In what follows, the domain of the variables A, B and C will be quite restricted, for reasons having to do with the 
nature of the debate I’m concerned with. Thus, the attitudes in conflict to be considered are of two broad types – 
cognitive and conative, with very few varieties of each (acceptance and rejection on the cognitive side; a general 
positive and a general negative attitude on the conative side). While more specific attitudes will be considered in section 
4.4., this is far from exhausting all the possibilities of conflicting attitudes. Similarly, the types of contents considered 
are propositional perspective-neutral contents, propositional perspective-specific contents and objects, while the levels 
of discourse are the semantic, the pragmatic and the implied. No doubt, a more complete project will involve a study of 




A word about notation: I will take ACCEPT and REJECT to be conflicting doxastic attitudes, PRO 
and CON to be conflicting conative attitudes and I will assume, at least for the time being, that 
ACCEPT (not-p) = REJECT (p) and that PRO (not-p) = CON (p). 
Thus, relativists such as Kölbel (2004b), Lasersohn (2005, 2016) or MacFarlane (2014) take 
the type of attitude involved in disagreement to be doxastic, the type of content to be perspective-
neutral propositions, and the level at which the disagreement takes place the level of semantic 
content. Thus, the exchange between Lisa and Bart will be rendered by relativists as follows: 
 
Relativism + Doxastic disagreement: 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty) 
Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty) 
 
It can be easily seen that this rendering corresponds to the schema, thus counting as minimal 
disagreement: as conceived by the relativist, the disagreement involves opposite attitudes (ACCEPT 
and REJECT), directed towards the same propositional semantic content (the perspective-neutral 
proposition that licorice is tasty). (As mentioned at the outset, their semantic apparatus also contains 
“circumstances of evaluation”, but they play no role in accounting for disagreement – at least on the 
simple view on disagreement presented here.)  
Next, take expressivists about ‘tasty’. On a pure version of the view (which, to my 
knowledge, no one currently holds, but it is nevertheless a possible position in logical space), the 
type of attitude involved in disagreement is conative (disagreement is “in attitude”), the type of 
content is sheer objects, and the level at which the disagreement takes place is also the level of 
semantic content. Our exchange will thus be rendered as follows: 
 
Pure expressivism + Conative disagreement: 
  Lisa: PRO (licorice) 
  Bart: CON (licorice) 
 
On a hybrid version (proposed for example by Huvenes (2012, 2014); Buekens (2011); Gutzmann 
(2016); Marques (2016)), there will be two tiers of meaning: the proposition asserted and the 
attitude expressed. Disagreement, according to the hybrid expressivist, is conceived in terms of 
conative attitudes towards objects, and is said to take place still at the semantic level, but at the 
second tier, of the attitude expressed, and not at the first, of the proposition asserted. Our exchange 




  Hybrid expressivism + Conative disagreement 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty/Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
PRO (licorice) 
Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty/Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
  CON (licorice) 
 
It is interesting to note that at the level of the asserted proposition,14 there can be two versions of 
hybrid expressivism: one employing perspective neutral contents like licorice is tasty, and the other 
employing perspective-specific contents like licorice is tasty for Lisa. This makes hybrid 
expressivism amenable to both a relativist interpretation (first option) and a contextualist one 
(second option). The merger between expressivism and contextualism has been more popular 
recently, with several contextualists adopting the “clash of attitudes” notion of disagreement. 
However, what is important is that, no matter how the semantic content is specified, disagreement is 
located at the level of the attitudes expressed, not at that of the asserted proposition. Even more 
importantly for our purposes, it is easy to see that both renderings (by pure expressivism, on the one 
hand, and by hybrid expressivism, on the other) conform to (MD), in that they employ conflicting 
attitudes (of a conative nature) directed towards the same content (an object), at (the second tier) of 
the semantic content. 
Moving on to other contextualist views, namely those that take disagreement to arise not at 
the semantic level, but at the pragmatic one, we get various renderings of our initial exchange, 
depending on the precise pragmatic mechanism said to be responsible for disagreement. Below are 
the renderings of the exchange between Lisa and Bart on a contextualist view that takes 
disagreement to be possible if a “presupposition of commonality” is in place (López de Sa (2007, 
2008, 2015); Kölbel (2007)); a contextualist view that takes disagreement to consist in the 
interlocutors accepting different “presuppositions of superiority” (Zakkou (2019)); one according to 
which disagreement arises at the level of implicatures (e.g., Finlay (2005)); another which takes 
disagreement to be metalinguistic (about what words do/should mean or what standards do/should 
prevail in a context – see Sundell (2011); Plunkett & Sundell (2013); Plunkett (2015)); finally, a 
contextualist view that treats disagreement as consisting in opposite discourse moves (Silk (2016)). 
In what follows, ‘PC’ stands for ‘presupposed content’, ‘Imp’ for ‘implicature’, ‘MC’ for 
‘metalinguistic content’ and ‘DM’ for discursive move. 
 
 
                                                             
14 I’m assuming here (alongside expressivists and most of the authors in the debate) that there is no rift between the 
semantic content of an utterance and the proposition asserted by that utterance. This is, of course, a controversial 
assumption, but one that I don’t think is harmful in this context. 
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Contextualism + “Presupposition of commonality” disagreement: 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
ACCEPT PC (Lisa and Bart have the same taste) 
  Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
ACCEPT PC (Lisa and Bart have the same taste)15 
 
Contextualism + “Presupposition of superiority” disagreement 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
  ACCEPT PC (Lisa is superior in taste to Bart) 
Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
  REJECT PC (Lisa is superior in taste to Bart) 
 
Contextualism + Implicature disagreement: 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
  ACCEPT Imp (Everyone should appreciate licorice) 
Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
  REJECT Imp (Everyone should appreciate licorice) 
 
Contextualism + Metalinguistic disagreement: 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
  ACCEPT MC (The right standard in this context is/should be Lisa’s) 
  Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
  REJECT MC (The right standard in this context is/should be Lisa’s) 
 
Contextualism + Discursive disagreement: 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
   ACCEPT DM (The standard in this context is Lisa’s) 
  Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
  REJECT DM (The standard in this context is Lisa’s) 
 
While differences between the various views are quite significant, all these versions of 
contextualism have in common the fact that disagreement involves doxastic attitudes directed 
                                                             
15 López de Sa’s rendering of the dialogue isn’t straightforwardly similar the other positions mentioned, given that at the 
level of presuppositions no disagreement arises. However, due to the uniformizing effect of the presupposition of 
commonality, disagreement is made possible at the semantic level – that is, Lisa and Bart end up having conflicting 
attitudes towards the same content (since Lisa and Bart’s standard of taste is the same). This disagreement, at the level 
of asserted content, conforms to (MD). 
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towards propositional contents and arises at the level of pragmatics.16 They all fit the (MD) schema, 
and thus count as minimal disagreement, by employing two conflicting attitudes (of a doxastic type) 
towards the same content (propositions), at a certain level of discourse (pragmatic).17 
Finally, it might be useful to clarify in what sense I take (MD) to be a notion that all 
participants in the debate could assent to, even in the absence of a specific understanding of the 
notion of conflict involved. I hold that they can do so in the sense that, when pressed about their 
more substantial notions begging the question against rival semantics views, each party to the 
debate can fall back on (MD). That is, when asked what makes their substantive notion one of 
disagreement, each participant can point to (MD). In this sense I think (MD) is something that all 
parties in the debate would agree that captures disagreement, and, if a previous referee for this paper 
is right, something that “everyone who’s acquainted with the debate would more or less 
                                                             
16 The attitudes in conflict need not be doxastic. As Worsnip (2019) argues, all the contextualist attempts to account for 
disagreement exemplified above can be put in terms of doxastic disagreement, but they need not be. However, this is 
not problematic for (MD). If you think that, for example, metalinguistic disagreement doesn’t involve doxastic attitudes 
towards propositions but rather conative attitudes, simply replace ACCEPT and REJECT with PRO and CON. What is 
important is that they are attitudes in conflict, directed towards the same content. 
 Also, I have taken some liberty with rendering the non-semantic, second layer content posited by various 
strategies. If you think that the way I render it in is inaccurate, please replace it with what you think is a better fit for the 
strategies in question. This shouldn’t affect he points I’m making in this paper. (For a nice discussion of the choices 
pertaining to at least some of these strategies, see Finlay (2017).) 
Finally, I note that some of the authors mentioned above are undecided about the pragmatic strategy they 
ultimately follow, and therefore categorizing their views might be more complicated than I suggested. For example, 
Zakkou (2019) situates the pragmatically conveyed content either at the level of presuppositions or at the level of 
implicatures; Marques (2016) is similarly ambivalent; etc. 
17 Using the same model, disagreement can be seen as arising at the level of implied content as well. The disagreement 
between Lisa and Bart in our main exchange could thus be seen as arising at the level of the contents implied by each 
utterance. What those contents are I take to be a highly contextual matter. For example, if we assume that Lisa and Bart 
have the common goal of buying sweets that they both like, a contextualist rendering of the exchange would be the 
following (with ‘IC’ standing for ‘implied content’): 
Contextualism + Implication disagreement:  
 Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty for Lisa) 
 ACCEPT IC (Lisa and Bart should buy licorice) 
 Bart: REJECT (Licorice is tasty for Bart) 
 REJECT IC (Lisa and Bart should buy licorice). 
This type of disagreement also conforms to (MD), since it involves conflicting doxastic attitudes directed towards the 
same implied propositional content. In the same vein, one can render the exchange between Lisa and Bart in which they 
use the ‘I like’ phrase (section 2) as arising at the level of implied content. Finally, let me note that there is a recent 
view proposed by Zouhar (2019), according to which disagreement is also (partially) explained in terms of implied 
content. 
Moreover, a similar strategy can be adopted in the case in which disagreement seems to appear with contents 
that are not contradictory, but nevertheless cannot be both true (in a certain context). For example, if Lisa utters 
‘Licorice is tasty’ and Bart answers ‘Nothing here is tasty’, the contents expressed by the two utterances are not strictly 
speaking contradictory, but the truth of the other precludes the truth of the other (if nothing is tasty, then neither licorice 
is). The strategy applies in that the disagreement can be seen as arising between the content of Lisa’s utterance and the 
relevant content implied by Bart’s utterance; we thus get the following rendering: 
Lisa: ACCEPT (Licorice is tasty) 
ACCEPT IC (Licorice is tasty) 
Bart: ACCEPT (Nothing in the relevant location is tasty) 
REJECT IC (Licorice is tasty). 
Again, this fits with (MD), in that the disagreement consists in conflicting doxastic attitudes directed towards the same 
implied propositional content. 
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spontaneously come up”.18 I think such an agreed-upon notion has value and should be theorized 
about explicitly. That is precisely the point of this paper. 
 
4 Defending minimal disagreement 
The notion of minimal disagreement put forward above is very simple, but does it hold water? In 
this section, I consider several natural worries one might have vis-à-vis the notion proposed and 
show that they are either easily put to rest or that the modifications required threaten neither the 
prospect of working it out nor its usefulness. During the discussion, several aspects of providing 
such a notion will come to the fore, further illuminating my endeavor. 
 
4.1. The worry about the neutrality of the attitudes/contents involved 
A key claim I made in showing how a notion of minimal disagreement can be forged was that it 
should start from extant notions found in the literature and abstract away, thus replacing the types of 
attitudes and types of content by their “neutral” counterparts. But what does this neutrality amount 
to? What kind of attitudes/contents is the schema employing? Aren’t we just multiplying types of 
attitude/content beyond necessity in forging this notion of minimal disagreement? 
This is a legitimate worry, but one that need not preoccupy us much. As mentioned above, 
(MD) is merely a schema. When I proposed replacing the types of attitude/content employed by 
current semantic theories with their “neutral” counterparts, I did not mean to imply that such 
counterparts are different, sui-generis attitudes towards different, sui-generis contents. What was 
meant is simply that the variables in the schema have to be filled in, in accordance with each 
semantic theory’s commitments. So proposing a notion of “minimal disagreement” like (MD) does 
not postulate further types of attitude/content and is thus conservative in this respect.19 
 
4.2. The overgeneration worry 
Another worry that might beset the notion of minimal disagreement proposed above is that it might 
overgenerate, predicting more cases of disagreement than is intuitive. The force of this objection 
can best be seen by considering a related argument against relativism taken from the literature. The 
argument, found in works like MacFarlane (2007) and Marques (2014), is leveled against the 
                                                             
18 Another route might be to provide notion of “minimal conflict” that all participants could agree on. Embarking on 
this route, however, will most likely lead to a replication of the issues already discussed. I thank a referee for requesting 
clarification on this point. 
19 As an example of new, sui-generis types of attitudes, consider Schroeder’s (2008) attitude of “being for”. While being 
in essence an expressivist type of attitude, its role is to cover both and thus serve as a common ground between 
cognitive and conative attitudes. On the other hand, as an example of new, sui-generis type of content consider 
Gibbard’s (2003) world-plan states. Crucially, neither of these should be taken as a model for the attitudes/contents 
figuring in (MD). As already made clear, the latter are mere abstractions to be fleshed out by giving values to the 
variables and not substantial attitudes/contents. 
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combination of relativism with a construal of disagreement as doxastic. It starts from the 
observation that in an exchange about meteorological events like 
 
Lisa (in New York): It’s raining. 
Bart (in Paris): No, it’s not, 
 
given that Lisa and Bart are in different locations, there is no intuition of disagreement. Yet, 
according to the relativist that embraces doxastic disagreement (across the board), the exchange 
should come out as disagreement. 
Now, the same kind of argument can be raised against the combination of relativism and 
(MD), thus showing that (MD) overgenerates disagreements. The problem is here that (MD) should 
be compatible with all the positions in the debate, and that none of the ways in which it is fleshed 
out should lead to unwanted disagreements. Yet – the exchange above shows – when combined 
with relativism, (MD) overgenerates by counting more disagreement than intuitively is the case. 
There are essentially two ways to deal with this problem. The first is simply to reject the 
application of relativism to meteorological expressions. While the position does have some 
contemporary adherents (e.g., Recanati (2007)), it has not been very popular among relativists 
themselves. The more important point is that the relativist about, say, predicates of taste, need not 
be committed to relativism about meteorological expressions; there is no tension in upholding one 
and rejecting the other. Thus, a relativist about predicates of taste can concede that meteorological 
sentences like “It is raining” express location-specific contents (that is, she can be a contextualist 
about meteorological expressions). If so, then the lack of intuition of disagreement in the case above 
is not problematic: indeed, it is what we should expect. Obviously, the good outcome for us is that 
by this maneuver (MD) has been shown not to overgenerate disagreements: no disagreement is 
predicted in the case above, while disagreement is predicted in the case of predicates of taste – in 
perfect conformity with our disagreement intuitions. 
However, while this reply is enough to address the data involving meteorological 
expressions, it has limited dialectical power. For, as several authors have noted (e.g., MacFarlane 
(2007, 2014), Marques (2014)), the overgeneration point can be brought to the fore by using factual 
claims made in different possible worlds where the relevant facts are different. Thus, assume that 
Lisa inhabits a world in which Jupiter has 63 moons and Bart inhabits a world in which Jupiter has 
64 moons. Bracketing issues about inter-world communication, in an exchange like 
 
Lisa (in world w1): Jupiter has 63 moons. 




the intuition of disagreement is lacking, as Lisa and Bart make claims that correspond to the facts as 
they are in their respective worlds. The question of whether counterparts in different worlds can 
disagree is vexed, but if one takes the intuitive point at face value, it is clear that the contextualist 
route is, as before, open to the relativist in dealing with this case. It is important to note, however, 
that taking the contextualist route leads to serious further complications. For what the contextualist 
route would amount to in such a case is the postulation of world-specific contents – that is, contents 
that contain a possible world as their part. The worry is not that such a view is unheard of – 
Schaffer’s (2012) necessitarianism is precisely such a view; the worry is that adopting such a view 
puts a much greater burden on the relativist. To be clear, there is no tension between being, say, a 
relativist about predicates of taste and a necessitarianist; the complications incurred by adopting this 
kind of position, however, are much more serious and require a lot of additional theoretical 
footwork. One very pertinent question that arises here is whether that additional theoretical 
footwork is warranted by the advantage relativists take themselves to have in accounting for the 
intuition of disagreement involving perspectival expressions (see also Schaffer (2018)).20 
The second way to approach the problem is also the way in which most relativists have dealt 
with it: namely, by modifying the notion of disagreement. Usually, this is done by imposing the 
condition that the disagreement has to arise with utterances whose contents are evaluated relative to 
the same circumstances of evaluation, either those of the context of utterance or those of the context 
of assessment (see, most prominently, MacFarlane (2007, 2014)). This is a significant departure 
from (MD), since the schema as proposed above makes no reference to circumstances of 
evaluation.21 Yet, there are several ways to incorporate this further condition. One is to simply add 
it as a separate entry in (MD), thus in effect transforming the notion of minimal disagreement. What 
would make this new notion minimal is the hope that all the parties to the debate would assent to it. 
                                                             
20 Moreover, the relativist who adopts (MD) will have problems with utterances said to have de se contents – for 
example, utterances of sentences containing the first person pronoun ‘I’. The intuition of disagreement involving 
exchanges with ‘I’ is also lacking (‘A: I’m a doctor./B: No, I’m not a doctor.’), and while the contextualist route is open 
here as well, taking it leads to rejecting de se contents for ‘I’. The more general worry is that, by following that route, 
all the advantages brought about the postulation of de se contents will be lost. 
Let me also note that another type of exchanges used to make the overgeneration point involves the present 
tense (as well as other tenses and temporal expressions): in exchanges like ‘A (at time t1): Socrates is sitting./B (at time 
t2): No, Socrates is not sitting.’, the intuition of disagreement is lacking, since A and B consider Socrates as sitting at 
different times. However, while contemporary temporalists agree with this, they also argue that the intuition of 
disagreement is present with other (more complex) examples involving the present tense: see, for example, Brogaard’s 
(2012) firefighter example. 
21 In this, it differs from recent attempts at defining (minimal) disagreement. Authors like Belleri & Palmira (2013), 
Belleri (2014) and Coliva & Moruzzi (2014) are happy to include relativity to circumstances in their notion of 
(minimal) disagreement. Also, the first two authors define disagreement in terms of the “accuracy” of acts of 
acceptance, which makes for a more theoretically sophisticated definition than the austere one proposed in this paper. 
My notion of disagreement can also be seen as minimal in that it uses very simple tools from the semanticist’s toolkit 
(notions like content, attitude and semantic level, but not accuracy, circumstance etc.). 
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I’m not entirely sure that such a hope can easily be fulfilled: circumstances are unlikely to play any 
role for the (pure) expressivist, for example. 
A second way to incorporate circumstances into the definition of minimal disagreement – 
the one I prefer – is the following: allow appeal to circumstances, but make it part of the notion of 
conflict involved in the definition of disagreement (as part of clause a) of (MD)) rather than putting 
it directly in the definition. This allows us to say that what conflict amounts to can vary – for 
example, with the type of attitudes that are in play. In other words, when (MD) is fleshed out by the 
relativist (that is, as involving doxastic attitudes towards propositions, at the semantic level), it 
becomes part of the notion of conflicting attitudes that the contents of interlocutors’ utterances are 
evaluated at the same circumstance. This is compatible with (MD) being fleshed out in different 
ways by other participants in the debate, for which the notion of conflict doesn’t involve 
circumstances at all, or involves a notion of circumstance that has fewer elements than the 
relativists fancies. In yet other words, this solution arrives at the notion of minimal disagreement by 
abstracting away not only from the type of attitudes, contents and levels of discourse, but also from 
what is meant by conflict. This move makes the notion of disagreement (via the notion of conflict 
involved) even more flexible and amenable to various views, while keeping it equally minimal.22 
 
4.3. The underdetermination/philosophical insignificance/lack of predictions worry 
At this point, especially given the second solution to the overgeneration problem evinced above, 
another worry arises: namely, that the notion of disagreement proposed is too indefinite to serve any 
theoretical role – too underdetermined. While I take the great flexibility of the notion to be an 
advantage, it might strike some readers as a shortcoming, for the reason just given. Stated a bit more 
precisely, the problem is that, conceived in this way, (MD) does not give rise to an informative 
notion of disagreement in the absence of a robust notion of conflict. This, in turn, makes the 
proposal less apt to compete with more philosophically substantive views in the literature, such as 
Belleri’s, Palmira’s or Worsnip’s. 
I understand how this might be deemed unsatisfactory, but I think there are at least two 
routes open here. One way to reply to the objection is to deny that my endeavor here amounts to a 
bona fide philosophical analysis or a full explication of the notion of disagreement, and thus that it 
                                                             
22 To be clear, my aim in the above discussion was not to save relativism (or any view, for that matter) from the 
objection that it cannot account for disagreement. That it cannot, despite this being one of the main motivations brought 
in its favor, has been claimed many times in the literature (for a very recent expression of this claim, see Baghramian & 
Coliva (2020)). I myself am sympathetic to the claim that the more substantial notion of disagreement relativists adopt 
undermines their own case. For the purposes of this paper, this is not a troublesome result. Generalizing the discussion, 
it merits stressing that the aim of the paper is not to defend any semantic view about perspectival expressions (so that if 
one such view is problematic, that is fine for the purpose of this paper), but something more basic: to make it possible 
for the views on the table to be able to have a meaningful debate about disagreement, with (MD) ensuring that none of 




is not exactly on a par with that of Belleri, Palmira, Worsnip and the other authors. In fact, in the list 
of motivations I gave for proposing a notion of minimal disagreement, providing a philosophical 
analysis of the notion of disagreement is missing. My endeavor can be taken as a purely practical 
one: to provide a notion that is useful for the semantic debate I’m concerned with. If so, evaluating 
the proposal should primarily take into consideration its usefulness – that is, one should take an 
instrumentalist stance here. Now, I do take myself to have shown that (MD) is useful along several 
dimensions. For example, I have shown that it provides a good way to systematize and generate the 
many notions of disagreement found in the recent literature, that it offers a more comprehensive 
basic notion of disagreement than some of the previous attempts and that it makes for a more 
parsimonious account. These achievements strike me as significant enough to deem the notion 
valuable. Of course, this opens up the further issue of what the relation between (MD) and the 
notion of disagreement arrived at at the end of a full philosophical analysis is. Rather than 
speculating about this issue, let me note instead that from the minimal notion I propose, it is quite 
easy to arrive at philosophically more substantive notions of minimal disagreement. For example, 
from (MD) one can easily arrive at Worsnip’s (2019) notion of disagreement by understanding the 
notion of conflict as interpersonal incoherence, while other possible minimal notions might be 
derivable too. If so, (MD) can also serve as a meta-theoretical template from which particular 
proposals of minimal notions of disagreement can be derived. 
However, I think that a stronger answer is available, which doesn’t involve denying that my 
endeavor amounts to a full philosophical analysis and thus that it is not on a par with extant 
accounts of disagreements. Bluntly put, the answer consists in claiming that what I have offered is 
indeed a full philosophical analysis of the notion of disagreement, but a “shallow” one: shallow in 
the sense that, in explicating the target notion (disagreement) it relies on notions that are themselves 
not fully explicated (e.g., conflict). While one might want to know more about the notions the 
analysis relies on, it is nevertheless a full philosophical analysis simply because it does offer an 
explication of the target notion. Such a strategy is not unheard of in philosophy. Take, for example, 
King’s (2007) view on propositions. King takes propositions to be complex facts about expressions 
standing in syntactical relations to each other, with their components standing in certain 
propositional relations that inherit their significance from syntax. As such, his analysis of 
propositions relies heavily on syntactic facts. Yet, while it is important to know what syntactic facts 
are, it is not incumbent on King to provide an analysis of syntactic facts in his attempt to provide an 
analysis of propositions. In fact, King’s analysis is compatible with various syntactic theories, 
which gives it a desirable pluralistic flavor. It is this shallow kind of analysis that I propose in the 
case of disagreement, too. Additionally, this shallow character of my analysis of the notion of 
disagreement is easier to square with the pluralistic attitude towards disagreement that many authors 
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in the debate exhibit (e.g, MacFarlane). (MD) can thus stand scrutiny alongside the other full-blown 
theories of disagreement on the market.23 
Now, even if one agrees that what I have provided is a full-blown (albeit shallow) analysis 
of disagreement, there is another aspect of the notion put forward that might be problematic. I have 
stressed several times that (MD) is no more than a schema, with the variables it contains having to 
be given values, operation which in turn leads to more specific, and more substantial, notions of 
disagreement. Supposedly, a substantial notion of disagreement would be able to make predictions 
about which exchanges should and which should not come out as disagreements. The question that 
arises is whether (MD), taken in itself, is able to do that. Without being able to make such 
predictions, the notion is very close not only to failing as an analysis of disagreement, but also to 
being useless. 
I certainly agree that the number and accuracy of the predictions made by the more 
substantial notions arrived at starting from (MD) are greater than those made by (MD) itself. 
However, it seems to me clear that, even as minimal as it is, (MD) is able to make the required 
predictions. Take, for example, the following exchange: 
 
Lisa: Licorice is tasty. 
Bart: Jupiter doesn’t have 63 moons. 
  
On the face of it, this exchange is as far from eliciting an intuition of disagreement as any exchange 
can be. Using (MD), this can be easily explained by the fact that no conflicting attitudes towards the 
same content can be found, at any level. Therefore, (MD) rules this exchange out as a case of 
disagreement, and thus predicts that this and other exchanges of the same type are not cases 
                                                             
23 This is perhaps the right place to discuss Worsnip’s (2019) proposal of a notion of minimal disagreement (the “wide” 
notion, as he calls it) as interpersonal incoherence. While I’m largely sympathetic to the proposal, I think this view is 
unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, his notion excludes disagreement involving centered contents (in fact, he 
takes his view on disagreement to be a reduction of the claim that we need centered contents). Worsnip trades here on 
the idea that there is no intuition of disagreement when the contents of certain utterances are centered – for example, in 
the case of the pronoun ‘I’. However, there is at least one view on the market (Kindermann (2019)) that treats sentences 
containing predicates of taste (which paradigmatically exhibit the intuition of disagreement) as expressing (multi-) 
centered contents. So, Worsnip’s view excludes a clear case of disagreement, thus running contrary to (accepted) 
intuition. 
Second, Worsnip’s notion makes no mention of levels of discourse where disagreement takes place. One 
consequence of this is the possibility of misplacing disagreement. As I mentioned in section 2, several of the 
contextualist strategies to fend off the challenge from disagreement appeal to pragmatic factors. For example, according 
to a view like Zakkou’s (2019), when Lisa argues with Bart about licorice, her use of ‘tasty’ triggers a presupposition of 
superiority to the effect that Lisa’s taste is superior to Bart’s. According to Worsnip’s account, for Lisa and Bart to 
disagree, they should have attitudes towards contents that neither of them could have compatible attitudes towards. But 
it is really important that these incompatible attitudes are towards presuppositions, and not towards the semantic 
content; it wouldn’t do, for example, to take the inconsistency to be between Lisa’s beliefs that licorice is tasty and that 
Bart’s taste is superior to hers (because, as such, these beliefs are not inconsistent). What this shows is that the level at 
which disagreement arises needs to be made explicit. This might be very easy to fix, but it requires a fix nevertheless. In 
contrast, (MD) has the level of discourse build-in in one of the clauses. 
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disagreement. Hence, the notion is able to make predictions.24 Let me also note that from the mere 
fact that the notion put forward has a certain structure (three clauses that use notions that stand in 
certain relations etc.) and thus that it has a certain profile that makes it differ from other notions of 
(minimal) disagreement, it follows that the prediction it yields are different than those made by (at 
least some of) those other notions. A notion of disagreement from which, say, the third clause of 
(MD) is missing would make different predictions than (MD) (according to such a notion, 
pragmatic disagreements will not come out as disagreements). 
There is perhaps yet another way to understand the underdetermination worry, in connection 
with my claim that (MD) captures the “folk notion” of disagreement – namely, that the notion is too 
thin to be grasped or entertained by anyone. Given that capturing the “folk notion” of disagreement 
is one of the roles I claimed this notion has, the worry in this interpretation is pressing. 
This worry is answerable, too. First, it is quite reasonable to think that, given the large 
variety found in the intuitive base of the phenomenon, the folk notion of disagreement itself might 
be quite underdetermined and multifaceted.25 (MD) surely reflects that indeterminacy, but grasping 
it shouldn’t be problematic. To see this, perhaps an analogy might help. Take the word ‘jade’. 
Relatively few people know that ‘jade’ is used to refer to two distinct kinds of mineral – what the 
scientists call ‘nephrite’ and ‘jadeite’. Although only scientists are able to discern which of the two 
types of mineral a particular use of ‘jade’ refers to, it seems reasonable to say that laypeople have 
the notion of jade, even if it is indeterminate between the two types of mineral. Moreover, such a 
notion is far from being useless: people employing it are able to distinguish jade from, say, 
sapphire, they are able to buy the right things etc. Similarly, the folk use an equally 
underdeterminate notion of disagreement (conflicting attitudes of some kind towards the same 
content of some kind etc.) when judging what exchanges are part of the intuitive base of the 
phenomenon, even if only philosophers are able to discern the more substantive notions of 
disagreement that (MD) gives rise to. The thinness of the notion is no obstacle for its being grasped 




                                                             
24 It might be argued that, with enough ingenuity, the context could be manipulated in such a way that the exchange 
elicits the intuition of disagreement: for example, if both Lisa and Bart speak in code, or if enough information 
regarding the linguistic behavior of the interlocutors is packed in etc. As far as I can tell, this is not problematic for my 
proposal: if an exchange can be made to elicit the notion of disagreement by manipulating the context in such ways, 
then that means that there will be conflicting attitudes towards the same content at a certain level of discourse, which is 
what (MD) predicts. Whether this can be done for any exchange is an empirical matter, one that the proponent of (MD) 
needs not commit to. It is also worth noting that some issues in this vicinity could perhaps be solved by making (MD) 
sensitive to context (by claiming, for example, that two interlocutors minimally disagree in a context if such and such 
conditions apply). 
25 See also Jenkins (2014), who takes the same line regarding verbal disputes in metaphysics.  
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4.4. Worries about the types of attitude involved and the generation of conflict 
Finally, another worry related to the notion of minimal disagreement proposed (perhaps latent in the 
discussion at the end of the previous section) is encapsulated in the question: does the scheme fit all 
and only the attitudes conflict of which leads to disagreement? On the one hand, there seem to be 
more attitudes that can be said to be in conflict than the ones considered here; on the other hand, for 
some of the attitudes considered, conflict arises only if certain conditions are in place. I will 
illustrate each type of worry by discussing two cases, one involving doxastic attitudes, the other 
conative ones. 
As it has been argued recently (Ferrari (ms)), not only do the believer and the atheist 
disagree with each other, but they also disagree with the agnostic as well. Agnosticism can be 
defined as the suspension of belief/disbelief in a significant religious proposition, such as that God 
exists. Suspension is taken to be a sui-generis doxastic attitude, on a par with ACCEPT and 
REJECT. But if one agrees that the disagreement mentioned exists, then my assumption that 
ACCEPT (not-p) = REJECT (p) fails (because for the agnostic a reason to reject that God exists is 
not a reason to accept that God doesn’t exist). Thus, a different way of spelling out the conflicting 
attitudes, and thus of generating disagreement, is needed. 
I am not entirely sure I have the intuition that the believer and the atheist, on the one hand, 
and the agnostic, on the other, disagree. But regardless, here is a possible fix that would incorporate 
the new doxastic attitude (call is SUSPEND) in the schema: instead of using ACCEPT and REJECT 
as genuine conflicting doxastic attitudes, one can use the attitude of acceptance of a proposition and 
that of considered non-acceptance (for lack of a better name) of the same proposition.26 This latter 
attitude should not be taken to be a different, sui-generis doxastic attitude (for the reasons spelled 
out in 4.1.), but as comprising both REJECT and SUSPEND as possible ways to be spelled out. By 
using this more comprehensive (albeit underdetermined) attitude, one can capture the disagreement 
between the believer and the atheist, on one hand, and the agnostic on the other, as well as the 
previous, more mundane type of disagreement.27 
                                                             
26 This is meant to exclude both cases in which one doesn’t accept a proposition because they haven’t considered it or 
don’t entertain it anymore, where I don’t think any disagreement is present. Other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, 
assuming, conjecturing etc., which assume entertaining a proposition, don’t seem to be in tension with acceptance of 
that proposition either, so the issue of disagreement involving those, on one hand, and ACCEPT, on the other, doesn’t 
arise. 
27 Another problematic case might come from taking doxasic attitudes to be credences, rather than full-fledged beliefs. 
Thus, if Lisa has credence 0.6 in a proposition while Bart has credence 0.9 in the same proposition, they disagree. Yet, 
this disagreement doesn’t involve conflicting attitudes (they are both beliefs, albeit of different degrees). I don’t pretend 
to have a worked out answer here, but here’s a thought: different degrees of belief count as different attitudes. Thus, 
Lisa’s attitude is of the type CREDENCE 0.6, which is in conflict with the attitude-type CREDENCE NON-0.6 that 
comprises all credences different from 0.6, including Bart’s attitude of type CREDENCE 0.9 (with the same proviso as 
before, that CREDENCE NON-0.6 is not a sui-generis attitude, lending itself to various ways of being fleshed out). 
This being said, I’m happy to concede that more work needs to be done to adapt the model of disagreement proposed 
here to disagreement in credence. 
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Moving on to the conative case, let me start by drawing attention to an observation made by 
Marques (2015, 2016) about the conditions under which certain conative attitudes generate conflict. 
Marques notes that, in a sense, one person liking/wishing/desiring something and a person not 
liking/desiring/wishing the same thing need not amount to conflict. If Lisa likes licorice and Bart 
doesn’t, such attitudes will manifest in behavior that can happily coexist: Lisa will go on eating 
licorice, Bart will go on avoiding it. However, she also notes that things are different when a certain 
practical matter, in the solving of which both interlocutors are involved, is at stake. For example, if 
Lisa and Bart want to buy something sweet that they both like, one liking licorice and the other not 
liking it is very likely to lead to an impasse. Here having different attitudes towards the same 
content generates conflict, and thus leads to disagreement. 
I concede that in the case of such attitudes the practical aspect should be taken into 
consideration. As before, I think the easiest way to introduce this in (MD) is not as a separate 
condition on disagreement, but as a specification of what it means for a certain type of attitudes 
(here, conative ones) to be in conflict. If what it takes for conative attitudes towards the same object 
to be in conflict is the presence of a practical issue that needs solving, then we should understand 
disagreement with conative attitudes as presupposing such a practical issue. Generally speaking, 
and as we’ve seen above in the case of incorporating circumstances into (MD), if a clash of 
attitudes of a certain type needs the specification of further conditions in which the clash amounts to 
conflict, then such conditions should be part of what conflict consists in with respect to the attitudes 
in question. To drive the point home: if certain ways of fleshing out (MD) come with additional 
conditions on when the types of attitudes at stake generate conflict, then these conditions should be 
accommodated by making them part of the definition of conflict for the attitudes in question. The 
important point is that such an accommodation does not make (MD) lose its status as the more basic 
notion of disagreement. 
 
5 Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, I motivated, forged and defended the postulation of a notion of minimal disagreement. 
I started by motivating the view by pointing to considerations related to the debate over the 
semantics of perspectival expressions between relativism, contextualism and expressivism. I then 
spelled it out by abstracting away from the various notions used by the parties to the debate 
mentioned. The result was a schema, (MD), that I took to specify three necessary and sufficient 
conditions for disagreement. Finally, I defended the proposed notion from four types of objections – 
one having to do with the neutrality of the attitudes/contents appealed to, one with overgeneration, 
one with the notion being underdetermined/philosophically insignificant, and the last pertaining to 
the issue of how conflict is generated when various types of attitudes (both cognitive and conative) 
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are considered. In a nutshell, I proposed a coherent notion of minimal disagreement that holds 
scrutiny, has good chances to amount to a full (albeit shallow) philosophical analysis of 
disagreement and is useful in that: 
- it accounts for all the cases that we intuitively take as disagreement – i.e., explicates the 
“folk notion” of disagreement; 
- it provides a useful way of systematizing and generating the many notions of disagreement 
recently put forward in the literature about the semantics of perspectival expressions, while 
ensuring that authors involved in this debate don’t talk past each other; 
- it leads to a parsimonious account (postulating one basic notion from which others can be 
derived rather than a multiplicity of notions); and, finally, 
- it offers a better basic notion of disagreement than the ones previously proposed in relation 
to the semantic debate about perspectival expressions by including all the views on the 
market (relativism, contextualism and expressivism). 
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